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1.0. Introduction 
 
Observations by scholars, local and international NGOs, media publications, surveys 
and statements by politicians reveal that abuses of government at national and local 
levels are widespread and in some extent out of control. This happens because of a 
number of reasons, including:  
 
1) inadequacy and inefficiency of existing legislation, failure of it’s enforcement,  
 
2) historical and cultural factors,  and inexperience of the public sector as people’s 
servant,  
 
3) lack of experience and absence of culture of judicial appeals by citizens / civil 
society challenging abusive administrative acts (though, recent enactment by the 
Parliament of the legislation about administrative courts, effective June 1, 2004, is a 
very positive step providing that complainers will effectively use new legislation as a 
tool), 
 
4) poor citizens participation in administrative decision-making due to lack of formal 
and informal  mechanisms for such participation. 
 
Abuse of official position creates distrust in government, disinterest in politics among 
the citizenry and even perception of corrupt government. The need for reforms in the 
public sector and enforcement mechanisms for related legislation is recognized both 
within the government and by the public. Policy research in this area and development 
of recommendations for changes is clearly on the public agenda, and will contribute to 
the restoration of people’s trust in government. 
 
The objective of the research was to study abuses at the local government level due to 
the lack of administrative remedies in cases of abuses of power and develop policy 
recommendations on administrative remedies for reducing of abuses. 
 
Government abuses at the local levels are wide spread according to different surveys 
and opinion polls conducted in the last few years. According to the “Comparative 
survey of Democratization and Value Changes, Country Survey Report: Mongolia” 
[1] the degree of people’s trust in Local Government was rated less than 50%. The 
same survey shows that corruption is more widespread at local levels of government 
than at the national level. 
 
The working hypothesis of the research was defined as follows: 
 
“Introduction of efficient administrative remedies in cases of abuse of power will 
reduce abuse of government, and consequently contribute to the restoration of 
people’s trust in government”. 
 
Comparative studies 
 
International experience shows that problems we are facing in Mongolia are similar to 
those in the post-communist countries.  
 
According to an opinion poll concerning public perceptions of accountable 
government carried out by the Romanian Academic Society in Slovakia, Bulgaria and 
Romania, low public trust in the state administration correlates with low “civic 
competence” and “insufficient participation on the part of the governed.” According 
to the survey, 33.8%, of Romanian, 18.4% of Bulgarian and 34.2% of Slovak 
respondents believe that “Civil servants and/or local government work in the public 
interest”. In the same poll, when asked their reaction to mistreatment by a civil 
servant, a significant number of Romanians said they “offer him/her something for 
fairer treatment” (23.0%) while significant numbers of Bulgarians and Slovaks said 
they would “complain to the proper authorities” (25.4% and 35.2%). But the largest 
group in all three countries said they would “let it rest” (39.3%, 40.4%  and 41.7%). 
In sum, the surveyors conclude, one of the key underlying problems in governance is 
the low “civic competence” among the governed.[2]  
 
An essential problem in improving good governance and reducing corruption in 
Eastern Europe and Russia is the difficulty in overcoming the inertia of a deeply 
ingrained, inward looking and politicized sense of responsibility among civil servants. 
Another essential problem, which is both a product of—and contributor to—the first 
problem, is the low “civic competence” of the general public, generated in large part 
by low expectations.  
 
One way out of this vicious circle would be to strengthen the remedies available to the 
governed and to encourage their use, gradually building up the public trust essential to 
a well-functioning system of governance. 
 
There are sometimes quite pessimistic views on government abuse. “Abusive 
treatment by the various state administrations is not universal. It is simply arbitrary 
and unpredictable…One never knows what treatment to expect from an 
administration; usually it turns out badly if you do not have a personal connection, 
and a bribe will be required. But even a bribe does not ensure that the services sought 
will be made available. Then again, it may work even without bribing, if you are 
lucky. The state of affairs is like the weather or God’s will: one never knows where 
one stands. And arbitrariness gives the civil servant power over the citizen, even more 
so than in communist times.” (Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “Culture of Corruption or 
Accountability Deficit?” East European Constitutional Review, Fall 2002/Winter 
2003. p. 83.) 
 
In some countries, the administrative structure of the government has prevented local 
councils from obtaining truly independent standing as governing and decision-making 
bodies. Georgian legislation is ambiguous concerning the roles of different levels of 
government, allowing for substantial overlaps in authority and functions. In turn, local 
governments lack the resources and capacity to respond to widely recognized 
demands and preferences of the local population. This is very true also for Mongolia, 
where centralization is still strong and local governments have miserable subsidies.  
 
Studies have evidenced that corruption undermines the institutional and procedural 
foundations upon which accountability mechanisms lie, and in many ways governs 
the informal relationships that currently exist between various institutions at the local 
level. Interestingly, high tolerance of corruption, coupled with a lack of administrative 
remedies to keep local institutions accountable, transparent, and responsive, have 
generated a strong sense of impunity among local officials. This fuels growing distrust 
and nihilism toward local institutions.  
 
1.1. Definition of Administrative Abuse 
 
In order to deal with government abuses there needs to be a working definition of 
“administrative abuse”. Definition used in the article “Trust Government: 
Administrative Remedies for Administrative Ills” [2] provide that, 
 
Administrative abuse is: 
 
· an act of enforcement,  
· promulgation of a norm,  
· taking of a decision, or 
· denial of a benefit,  
 
by a state official, which is: 
 
· illegal,  
· a result of inappropriate exercise of discretion, or  
· procedurally improper, irregular or erroneous.  
 
The publication further states, that “within the context of formal and informal rule-
making (promulgation of normative acts as well as issuing of less formal guidance), 
an expansive definition of administrative abuse would further define “procedurally 
proper” to always require a transparent and open process involving public 
participation”.  
 
Administrative abuses can include actions which are illegal (such as taking a bribe), 
violate normal procedures (such as the preferential processing of paperwork) or which 
involve the inappropriate exercise of discretion (based on, for example, nepotism, 
cronyism, partisan politics or discrimination). 
 
In addition to above, laws and regulations contain a term “failure of taking an action” 
meaning absence of appropriate action that leads to non-fulfillment of legitimate 
rights of citizens.  
 
1.2. Research methodology 
 
Areas of government abuse chosen for the research were political patronage and 
nepotism. This types of abuse are most harmful since they lay ground and become 
soil for corruption and impunity.  
 
Note: Government abuse in favor of the political party and elections were excluded 
on the ground that separate research on that topic was included in the Policy 
Fellowship Program of the Open Society Forum Mongolia.    
 
Research methodology was designed with consideration of objective and subjective 
difficulties related to the topic of the research, i.e. little or no official records of 
government abuses by the government itself, reluctance of government officials to 
provide relevant information during interviews or reference to the state secrecy law, 
that provides high degree of non-disclosure for documents of government agencies. In 
almost all cases when talking about particular cases of abuses with the people 
currently employed at the local governments, they wanted not to be identified.  On the 
other hand media publications, NGO sources, anecdotal evidence although providing 
fair quantity of information they are usually lacking credibility. Nonetheless following 
units of analysis were used: government officials at the local level, public servants at 
the local level, general public (especially those who were affected by consequences of 
abuses), non-government organizations and private business community.  
 
Case studies involved local government offices and agencies and cover period of time 
starting June 1, 2003 through June 1, 2004. Geographic area covered Bayangol district 
of Ulaanbaatar, city of Darkhan and Ovorkhangai aimag (province).  
 
Data surveyed was quantitative, such as survey analysis and statistics of complaints, 
publications, government decrees, cases of violations of public service law. And 
qualitative: laws and regulations, case study, interviews, content-analysis of the 
media.  
 
Data collection involved data that already have been collected and new data gathered 
form variety of sources available from centralized sources (such as Parliament, 
Government, NGOs, research institutions) and documents and facts obtained during 
field trips from local governments and groups and individuals.  
 
About 90 people from above mentioned locations were interviewed. Government 
officials included aimag governors and officials in charge of citizen’s complaints, 
human resources employees and other staff of local government offices. Researcher 
met and talked to representatives of political parties and local NGOs, local business 
community.  
 
2.0. Types of government abuse 
 
When government abuse happens? Examples could be: Local government official 
investigating the health and safety standards in restaurants uses his/her discretionary 
power to threaten owners to close down or suspend operation of their premises. This 
happen frequently in of restaurants, cafeteria and bars in the districts of Ulaanbaatar 
and provinces. Other forms of abuse of power is, for example, when some company 
owners use influence or bribery to induce civil servants to investigate a competing 
restaurant/bar for a violation of health and safety standards, or in the context of tax 
administration, to audit the accounts of a competing company. In some instances, 
initiating an investigation is also the product of partisan politics. Government 
agencies investigate the financial dealings of particular companies because of their 
formal or informal affiliation with opposition political formations rather than for 
politically neutral reasons. There are cases when authorities initiate investigations of 
NGOs motivated by a perception that they are working in opposition to the 
government. 
 
When conducting this research, initial survey of documents and interviews revealed 
wide range of areas of the local government activities where abuses could be 
identified in accordance with the definition given earlier. By analyzing different types 
of abuses researcher identified following two areas; 
 
1. Political patronage when appointing and recruiting for government jobs.  
2. Nepotism in the government service. 
  
Above areas of government abuse are most important to study in order to 
provide remedies because political patronage and nepotism create soil for 
corruption and impunity, “circle of silence”.   
 
2.1. Political patronage when appointing and recruiting for government jobs 
 
Government appointments in Mongolia are regulated by law and in general could be 
divided into two groups: political appointees and government employees. Almost all 
of the political appointees relate to the central government, such as ministries and 
agencies. At the local executive level aimag /duureg (provincial/district) and 
soum/horoo (sub-province/sub-district) governors are semi-elected-appointed (after 
being elected by local hurals (councils) those positions require approval of higher 
level authorities). All remaining staff at the local government is appointed by the 
decree of the governor or the head of the chancellery. [3] . 
 
History of elections in Mongolia shows that every new Government both at the central 
and local level is characterized with mass firings based on political affiliation. 
Vacancies then are filled with people who are members of the ruling party or those 
who are loyal to the party.  
 
One important guarantee of the right to freely associate is the constitutional provision 
forbidding discrimination against a person based on his or her affiliation or 
membership in a party or other civic organization. Accordingly, legislation on public 
service prohibits this kind of discrimination. 
 
However, in recent years there have been many cases of dismissal or failure to hire 
persons by reason of overt or covert discrimination on the basis of party affiliation. 
There has been a rising number of large-scale lay-offs of civil servants, particularly 
following the last two /1996 and 2000/ parliamentary and local legislature elections. 
 
Although these trends are not openly precipitated by official decisions of the 
leadership, the research documenting these cases calls for serious attention. 
 
According to the report of the Public Service Council, “the two elections since 1996 
led to an abrupt shift of power from one political coalition to another and many 
changes in government, which has had a highly negative effect on public servants.”  
 
The number of people who have been fired from work due to discrimination on the 
basis of their party affiliation between 1992-2002 amounts to 850 in one aimag 
(Hovd). 
 
The Public Service Council, an independent organization that reports to the State 
Great Khural, manages the standards of public service within its executive power. 
One of the functions of the Council is to monitor and resolve disputes involving an 
alleged violation of the rights of state administration employees. According to the 
Council, it received 165 complaints between July 1995 and June 2001 of unjustified 
lay-offs of state employees and unjustified refusal to hire persons who had passed the 
Public Service qualification exams. Of the complaints, the Council was able to re-
institute or provide with new jobs 56.3% of the plaintiffs (93 persons). In addition, the 
courts considered the cases of 9.7% of the plaintiffs (16 persons), who were re-
instituted them in their previous jobs by court decision. [5] 
 
According to political party officials number of people illegally discharged after 
Parliamentary and local elections vary between 30% - 60% at the local government 
level. Of all cases of firings only small percentage (less than 10%) of individuals filed 
formal complaints to Civil Service Council or to the courts. Survey and interviews 
revealed that reasons for hesitation of complaining are disbelief and distrust in 
fairness of mentioned institutions. Few cases dealt with in the Civil Service Council 
or courts and solved in favor of the complaints ended up in rehabilitation of civil 
servant, but after short period of time supervisors / higher ranking officials found new 
“reasons” for repeated discharge of the same individuals. Common practice is also so-
called “structural change” when the former position of the discharged person is 
eliminated or renamed and this serves as a reason for refusal to re-hire the same 
person.  Political party patronage is the strongest underlying base for government 
appointments and recruitment for government jobs. The system works from very top 
of the central government and goes down to lowest level of the local government. 
  
Parliamentary website (www.parl.gov.mn) hosts “Citizen opinion” page and several 
of opinions relate to the issue of political patronage when appointing and recruiting 
for government jobs. One of them (May 20, 2004, author didn’t give his/her identity) 
writes that after elections people are appointed to government positions without 
consideration of their skills and experience. Appointments go to those who have no 
ethics and lack ability to perform government service. Primary condition is loyalty to 
political party that won elections. He/she continues by saying that his/her previous 
remark about particular case was not answered and no action was undertaken to stop 
unfair practice. 
 
When interviewing government officials in Drakhan, one of them said: “Corruption 
leads to the situation when business is done extra legally. For instance, at our 
organization two positions were granted to unqualified people who gave bribes, but 
not to those qualified. Legally there should be fair competition among best candidates 
for jobs. Now, best people and assigned jobs both suffer”. In this case we have direct 
bribe involved, but in number of other cases interviewers said that political patronage 
was main factor when hiring for government. With increased unemployment loyalty 
becomes not enough a condition and now media publications point out to facts when 
appointments are commonly accompanied by in advance payment in the form of 
campaign contributions or direct payments. 
 
Political patronage can be seen even in the business sector. The political patronage in 
this area is most common in relation with government owned enterprises and 
government procurement. To give an example, copper mine “Erdenet”, a fully 
government owned company, is the largest business entity in Mongolia with annual 
revenues amounting to 35% of  the state budget About 60 small and medium size 
enterprises supply “Erdenet” with different kind of products and services. Almost all 
of them are chosen based on political party affiliation or loyalty of the owners of those 
business entities. Every time government changes all suppliers also change (D.Tsetsen 
“The Business News”, June 06-12, 2004. No.21(078). [6]. 
 
 
2.2. Nepotism 
 
Nepotism and political patronage are interwoven in the Mongolian society. Although 
no statistical data could be found on political party affiliation within the family 
members and relatives, but empirical experience show that majority of politically 
active population is characterized in general by family based loyalty to one particular 
political party.  
 
Political patronage and nepotism involves different types of favoritism that is rooted 
in the Mongolian society. Political scientist D.Gankhuyag in his article “Specific 
feature of Mongolia’s Social Relationship” (Open Society Forum website: 
www.forum.mn) describes traditional roots favoritism in Mongolia as follows [7]: 
“Mongolians are much more dependent on each other than any other nation in the 
world. In other words, we are all brothers and sisters. It is reality and without 
considering this reality any plans for a change in the society are doomed to failure. 
This reality does not fit any foreign theories and experiences. It is an outstanding 
phenomenon and the problems of our social life emanate from it. 
The actors in Mongolian society are very closely related to each other, people-to-
people relationship is predominantly based on ties of kinship, fellowship, place of 
origin and acquaintances. Mongolia is a country of relatives and acquaintances. 
Theoretically, that means that the pattern of Mongolia’s social relationship at macro 
and micro levels is too close and interrelated. There are four categories of 
relationships. 
Kinship relationship. The kinship relationship between the members of a family being 
the core of the society plays a significant role. Between 1950 and 1970 when birth 
rates were high, a family on average had 4 children. In other words, one person had 4 
brothers or sisters. When that person gets married the number of relatives increases 
two-fold adding. After marriage in big families the number of relatives reaches 
around 300-400 persons. If two such families unite they could form a political party 
/801 members are required to form a party/.Of course, this is an exaggeration. 
This network of kinship relationship seems to prove the assertion that “there are 
elements of a tribal system in Mongolia” made by historian B. Bold. Mongolians tend 
liking relatives. It is not important whether it is “bad” or “good”. But it is necessary 
to treat it as reality. This relationship is prone to affect other spheres of society such 
as political and economic fields. 
School or class-mate relationship. The traditional educational system in Mongolia 
was becoming unpopular and introduction of European educational system was a new 
phenomenon in social life at the beginning of the 20th Century. The establishment of a 
national educational network in Mongolia in 1950-1960 led to transformation of the 
traditional social relationship. The key element of this system was bringing up 
children within the community, say, at boarding schools which forms “one pot” 
psychology. To have a common ideology was also an important factor. When people 
live together for 8-10 years, attend same classes and eat from one pot that makes 
them uniform. When children reach the age of 18 they become life-long friends and 
brothers. Even later at work they cling to this community mentality. After school few 
of classmates continue to maintain regular contacts. The rest, though, without regular 
contacts stand ready to support and aid each other in case of need. This direct 
interrelationship is weaker in Ulaanbaatar and other cities. High-ranking people 
have a relationship originating from their degree study. 
Professional or business relationship. People get very close when they work together 
for many years. This kind of relationship is significant because of common ideology 
and uncompetitive atmosphere under socialism. An example, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs is much criticized for nepotism. For decades Mongolian diplomats were 
trained mainly in the former USSR Diplomatic Academy and the Institute of 
International Relations. It is natural that when X or Y becomes Foreign Minister he 
has to rely on this staff. The situation is same in other areas and the interrelationship 
of the leadership is a real thing. 
Fellow relationship. The Mongolians being herders have very strong feelings for the 
people of their native land. The people in rural and urban areas have had more or 
less constant relationship. This relationship is now evolving into a new business-like 
relationship. All Mongolians would rejoice when a wrestler from his native land wins 
or become nostalgic when he feels homesick. This relationship is likely to remain. The 
emergence of informal relationships like those of native land councils will certainly 
enhance this relationship. 
The above-mentioned relationships do not just exist but interact in a way that could 
have strong impact on the society, individuals and family. 
How do the Mongolians get their work done? 
When Mongolians handle their private problems they do not think about relevant 
institutions or existing laws and regulations. They will first of all think about 
somebody who can deal with the problem. As a rule, they will seek such “an 
important” person among their relatives and friends. It is very good if that person is 
high-ranked. The theory of probability assumes with 50 per cent warrant that one 
would find his fellowman, classmate or relative as a doctor, judge, trader, driver, 
director or cashier. Sometimes it fails. Then he will inform his own circle about it and 
try to find the person from other circles. In this case his chances will reach 60-70 per 
cent. If he fails he will start another round of search. His chances will reach 90-100 
per cent. Thus, Mongolians “complicate” things by not approaching the right person 
and this is regarded as almost natural. 
This phenomenon called “bribery”, “back door” or “corruption” nowadays 
emanates from the social relationship and has a common root. Speaking in concrete 
terms, we do have corruption. Corruption is so evident as if it is on your palm. 
Though, we do not know the details, if one is aware of the “specific” relationship 
everything is clear. 
It is important to know this specific feature of Mongolia’s social system, it is even 
more important if we understand these specifics. Foreigners hardly can understand 
this but we ourselves should understand this specific feature. This interrelationship 
among Mongolians is not necessarily of negative nature. It can have benefits, even 
more than we can imagine”. 
 
# # # 
 
Above article sounds very compelling, though as mentioned earlier, when an issue of 
appointing or recruiting government employees for different positions, political party 
affiliation and loyalty to party leaders become the strongest argument. Favorable 
treatment by the party leadership is commonly based on long time loyalty, but 
according to gossips and numerous rumors published in the newspapers one can 
“buy” a position through large contributions to the political party and/or by bribing 
those leaders who have a power to appoint and recruit for government jobs. 
 
3.0 Current Regulations 
 
If government appointments are heavily influenced by political patronage, what about 
legal requirements and employment standards.  
 
When analyzing related legislation [4] (such as, Constitution of Mongolia, Labor 
Law, Public Service Law, Public Administration and Finance Law, Law about Local 
Administration), laws have rather general provisions (such as, education, profession, 
experience, knowledge, qualification) that can be interpreted subjectively, thus 
providing too much discretionary power for deciding who gets the job. And here 
comes the potential for abuse of power and corruption. 
 
Constitution of Mongolia, Article 14 (2) says: “No person may be discriminated on 
the basis of ethnic origin, language, race, age, sex, social origin or status, property, 
occupation or post, religion, opinion, or education”. 
 
Labor Law (from 1999), Article 7.2 provides that “in the labor relations it shall be 
prohibited to discriminate on the grounds of ethnicity, social origin or status, race, 
sex, property, religion, opinion; or to create advantages”.   
 
Public Service Law (from 2002), Article 4.2.4 says: “Citizens shall have equal 
opportunities to enter the pubic service in accordance with the conditions and rules set 
by law”. Article 16.1 provides for non-discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, 
social origin or status, race, sex, property, religion, opinion, party or other non-
government organization affiliation. 
 
Law on Administrative and Territorial Units and Their Governance (from 2002) 
declares in its Article 5.1.3 that government employees shall be appointed through 
competitive process and on the ground of their knowledge, education, profession, 
experience, specification skills only, and their performance shall be evaluated 
realistically. The law prohibits groundless dismissal of an employee (Article 14)  
  
Criminal Code contains number of provisions prohibiting employment 
discrimination, illegal dismissal of government employees, abuse of power.  
Article 134.1. “Discrimination, persecution or obvious restriction of a citizen's right 
or legitimate interests for joining a political party or a non-governmental organization 
committed by an official shall be punishable by 250 to 350 hours of forced labor with 
deprivation of the right to hold specified positions or engage in specified business for 
a term of up to 3 years, incarceration for a term of more than 3 to 6 months or 
imprisonment for a term of up to 2 years. 
Article 272. Neglect of duties by a state official 
272.1. Omission or inadequate performance by an official of his/her official duties 
assigned by legislation and regulations enacted in conformity therewith that has 
caused a substantial damage shall be punishable by a fine equal to 5 to 50 amounts of 
minimum salary or by incarceration for a term of 1 to 3 months. 
272.2. The same crime if it has caused a grave harm shall be punishable by 
imprisonment for a term of up to 3 years with or without deprivation of the right to 
hold specified positions or engage in specified business for a term of up to 2 years. 
Article 263. Abuse of power or of office by a state official  
263. 1. Abuse of power or of office by a state official, if it has been committed for 
lucrative or other personal interests and has caused a substantial damage to rights and 
interests of the citizens shall be punishable by a fine equal to 5 to 50 amounts of 
minimum salary with deprivation of the right to hold specified positions or engage in 
specified business for a term of up to 3 years or by incarceration for a term of 1 to 3 
months. 
263.2. The same crime committed repeatedly or if it has caused damage in a large 
amount shall be punishable by a fine equal to 51 to 100 amounts of minimum salary 
or imprisonment for a term of up to 5 years with deprivation of the right to hold 
specified positions or engage in specified business for a term of up to 5 years. 
Note: State officials referred to in this chapter include the political, special, 
administrative and technical service civil servants. 
Article 264. Excess of authority by a state official 
264.1. Obvious excess by an official of the limits of rights and powers afforded to 
him/her by law, if it has caused a substantial damage to the rights and interests of a 
business entity, organization or citizens shall be punishable by a fine equal to 5 to 50 
amounts of minimum salary with deprivation of the right to hold specified positions or 
engage in specified business for a term of up to 3 years, or by incarceration for a term 
of 1 to 3 months. 
264.2. The same crime committed repeatedly, by use of violence or threat with such, 
or if it has caused damage in a large or an extremely large amount shall be punishable 
by a fine equal to 51 to 100 amounts of minimum salary, incarceration for a term of 
more than 3 to 6 months or imprisonment for a term of up to 5 years with deprivation 
of the right to hold specified positions or engage in specified business for a term of up 
to 5 years. 
 
Some government positions require selection procedures, but they lack openness at 
one hand, and selecting bodies are not pluralistic.  
 
Small scale local survey conducted in Ovorkhangai province [8] gives us some insight 
on corruption at the local level. Selected questions and answers are given below (see 
Appendix 1 for full survey).         
 
In 2003 Citizen Information and Service center of the Ovorkhangai aimag’s 
(province) Citizen’s Representative Hural (local parliament) conducted survey on 
corruption. Survey was conducted in soums (administrative units) Arvaikheer, 
Uyanga, Nariinteel, Burd, Bayan-Ondor, Yosonzuil, Hujirt and Hairhandulaan of the 
Ovorkhangai aimag. Total of 285 respondents of different age, sex, education and 
employment from urban and rural area participated in the survey. Data is given below 
(statistical errors and variations in transcription were left unchanged as they appear 
in the original document). 
 
From the survey researcher selected questions that directly or indirectly relate to the 
political patronage or nepotism. 
 
Causes of corruption 
  
Decline of morality 57 20% 
Decline of living standard 61 21.4% 
Weakness of law enforcement 78 27.3% 
Officials are not held 
responsible 
81 28.4% 
 
Is corruption related to politics? 
 
Yes 87 30.5% 
No 62 21.7% 
Somewhat 44 15.4% 
Mostly 45 15.7% 
Don’t know 31 10.8% 
 
Who is most vulnerable to corruption? 
 
Those who have power 97 34% 
High ranking officials  35 12.3% 
Officials in-charge of certain 
issues 
69 24.2% 
Politicians 17 5.9% 
 
Besides political favoritism, nepotism is quite common at the local government level. 
Although Civil Service Law prohibits employment of relatives at the subordinate 
positions, at local government levels instances of employing even direct relatives are 
not rare. For example, in Ovorkhangai aimag provincial City Hall is called by the 
people as “Family Hall”.    
 
Survey conducted by the “Zorig Foundation” [9] reveals high perception of nepotism 
in the government. 
 
Evaluation of spreading of corruption (cumulative %) 
 
  Very common  Common  rare  
 Not 
common 
at all  
Invite officials for meals 
and give small gifts 56.9 37.1 5.6 0.4 
Officials provide jobs 
for relatives 58.7 33.3 6.7 1.3 
Officials use their 
position for private 
gain 53.4 38.3 7.4 1.0 
Give officials things of 
big value 29.9 45.9 23.1 1.1 
Give officials big 
amount of money 32.1 37.0 29.2 1.8 
Government officials 25.1 28.7 40.6 5.6 
engage with criminals 
 
 
4.0 Reasons why government abuses occur 
 
When analyzing abuse of power there is general pattern why it happens. 
 
1. Inadequacy and inefficiency of existing legislation. 
 
Laws and regulations, although they provide for government officials some degree of  
responsibility and accountability when exercising the power, but law provisions are 
mainly vague, have little details or leave space for unauthorized interpretations. Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) research concludes: “Mongolian laws tend to be general, 
descriptive and vague. Normally few, if any, definitions are given. The laws often 
create rights but not duties, leave the implementing agencies undefined, and fail to set 
out procedures” [10]. 
 
Public Service Law prohibits abuse of official authority (provision 40.2.). But the 
law does not define what types of abuse are meant. Another provision of the same law 
(4.2.7.) provides that the state bears any losses caused by the fault action of the state 
employee when exercising it’s authoritative power. What agency / authority is obliged 
to do this is not clear from this law.  
 
Law on Administrative and Territorial Units and Their Governance (from 2002) 
declares in its Article 5.1.3 that government employees shall be appointed through 
competitive process and on the ground of their knowledge, education, profession, 
experience, specification skills only, and their performance shall be evaluated 
realistically. The law prohibits groundless dismissal of an employee (Article 14). The 
same law says that government official that violated Article 14 shall be dismissed 
(Article 65.3)  
 
Above we see provisions that mean that if the supervisor dismisses his/her employee 
without a reason, than he/she will be dismissed too. That means supervisors will have 
a great fear for firing employees on one hand, and the employees will feel safe and 
“untouchable”. There is no evidence of cases when those law provisions were 
enforced.    
 
2. Failure of law enforcement. 
 
Even in cases where laws provide for clear and precise actions for abuse of power, 
those provisions are not enforced. This is due to “non-action” (“silence”) of those who 
are in-charge of enforcement, but also reluctance of those who witnessed the abuse to 
disclose it. Also there is a hesitation to seek justice by those who were affected by the 
wrong-doing, because of disbelief in redress. 
 
For example, provision of the Public Service Law (16.2.3) prohibits government 
official to employ in the same administrative unit “family members and relatives to 
positions directly subordinate to or under direct supervision of the employer”. We 
have seen earlier failure of enforcement of this provision (interviews in Ovorkhangai; 
public opinion survey).     
 
3. Lack of transparency of the government. 
 
Although laws and regulations provide in some degree adequate procedures for 
government appointments, absence of transparency and accountability allows officials 
to disobey set rules and make self-willed decisions. 
Public Service Law provides for public announcement of government vacancies 
(provision 17.5), but this happens very rare and in inappropriate manner, such as at 
the information board of the local administration only. 
Another example is publication of official resumes of newly appointed government 
officials. They don’t provide information about spouses and children of the appointee 
sufficient enough to show absence of conflict of interest or nepotism.  
 
4. Historical and cultural factors and inexperience of the public sector as 
people’s servant. 
 
Specific of social relations among Mongols (as seen in the article by D.Gankhuyag 
[7]) negatively affect fairness in the government service. On the other hand 
government service is not yet established as service to the public, but rather sees itself 
as authority above people. 
 
5. Lack of experience and absence of culture of judicial appeals by citizens / 
civil society challenging abusive administrative acts. 
 
There are very few examples of citizen appeals. Yet, civil society should fully use 
newly established Administrative courts for fight against administrative abuses. In this 
regard few NGOs working on small number of cases will not succeed, but only large 
scale fight of the civil society as a whole will help to establish the justice. 
 
5.0. Administrative Remedies 
 
One of the cardinal features of a state governed by the rule of law is that there is a 
legal remedy for every wrong, including those that may be committed by agents of the 
state. Remedies are provided through the institutions, norms and procedures created 
by constitutions, as well as by ordinary legislation and other normative acts. (Edwin 
Rekosh, Public Interest Law Initiative, Columbia University). 
 
 In considering how to strengthen these remedies, it may be useful to think of them in 
several categories: internal remedies, external remedies and preventive remedies. 
 
A reason to reformulate some of the accountability notions in terms of remedies is 
that it shifts the focus to the individual and his or her legal rights. A focus on remedies 
answers the question: what are the mechanisms available to the individual in order to 
have some recourse after suffering an administrative abuse or which provide a means 
for avoiding abuses? Remedies do provide a means of holding state officials 
accountable for their actions, but there are many other important means of improving 
accountability which do not necessarily provide individuals with remedies to specific 
wrongs committed against them. Examples might include elections, inter-agency 
oversight and auditing, internal performance reviews, user surveys, etc. 
 
Mongolian laws provide in some extent remedies for abuses in cases of illegal 
discharge from government jobs. Constitution of Mongolia prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of ethnic origin, language, race, age, sex, social origin or status, property, 
occupation or post, religion, opinion, or education [Article 14 (2)] Discrimination and 
persecution of a person for joining a political party or other associations or for being 
their member are prohibited [Article 16 (10)]. And Public Administration and Finance 
Law (14.1.8) provides that unjustified dismissal of an employee or violation of the 
provision about recruitment is prohibited. Another provision of the same law (65.3) 
constitutes that violation of the above provision (14.1.8) shall become a ground for 
dismissal of the person who violated this provision. Logically it looks like the boss 
that fired a subordinate shall be fired in his turn. Here we see an example how vague 
are Mongolian laws.  
 
Internal Remedies 
 
There are usually a variety of internal remedies available to individuals who have 
suffered an administrative abuse in the form of an individualized decision withholding 
a benefit or imposing a burden. The individual’s first recourse might be to complain to 
the supervisor of the civil servant who committed the abuse, often through a formal, 
written process.  
 
The primary difficulty with this remedy in practice is that it depends on: (1) the 
supervisor having a good understanding of his or her own responsibility to the general 
public; (2) a supervisor who is not complicit in the abusive practices of his or her 
subordinate; (3) a willingness to challenge the behavior of a subordinate based on a 
“customer” complaint; and (4) the absence of a culture of “collegiality” favoring the 
status quo. 
 
Other internal remedies might include an appeal to an internal, quasi-judicial process 
or to a supervisory board, such as an ethics panel. Such mechanisms offer the 
possibility of overcoming the difficulties outlined above because they are more 
removed from the day-to-day collegial environment, but they are somewhat 
susceptible to the same drawbacks. 
 
Since the key obstacles to the effectiveness of internal remedies relate to the attitudes 
and behaviors of staff, efforts to strengthen internal remedies should rely primarily on 
reforming personnel policies. While there is no easy recipe for doing this, some of the 
elements might include: (1) transparency in the appointment process (advertising of 
openings, publishing lists of candidates, etc.); (2) training of new employees that 
includes practical exercises relating to public service, ethics, the duty to disclose 
information, privacy, conflict of interest, confidentiality, exercise of discretion, 
documentation of reasons, due process, etc.; and (3) performance evaluation based on 
clear job descriptions that includes criteria relating to respect for the general public, 
client satisfaction, etc. 
 
Mongolia Medium-Term Civil Service Reform Strategy adopted in April 2004 
provides among other following principles: 
 
• Public Service – members of the Mongolian civil service recognize their 
primary duty is to the government and people of Mongolia above their 
personal interests. 
• Merit – all appointments and career advancement of individuals should be 
based solely on qualification and performance. 
• Right people in the right job – the objective of the appointment process is to 
have the most appropriate qualified person in each position, regardless of 
organizational affiliation. 
 
The same document names reform policies set in the Public Service Law and other 
relevant acts: 
 
• Political neutrality of the civil service 
• Transparency in personnel decisions 
• Equal opportunity for all Mongolian citizens to enter the civil service 
• Codification of the rights and obligations of civil servants and a code of 
ethics 
• Declaration of income and property interests 
• Prevention of nepotism 
 
 
External Remedies 
 
In cases of administrative abuses in the conferring of benefits and imposing of 
burdens through individualized decisions, there are external remedies as well, the 
strongest of which is judicial review. Sometimes there is a formal requirement to seek 
an internal remedy before a court will hear a complaint about an administrative abuse. 
Often, it is not within the court’s purview to examine the merits of the administrative 
decision, but only to determine its “legality”: whether the proper procedures were 
followed and whether the decision was consistent with the law. 
 
Among the obstacles to the effectiveness of judicial remedies are procedural barriers, 
such as high court fees, as well as the complexity of the proceedings and relevant law, 
insufficient public understanding of how to initiate legal proceedings, lack of legal 
assistance for persons who can’t afford to hire a lawyer and low public trust in the 
courts. 
 
In case of Mongolia public trust in courts is lowest among state organizations. 
According to the survey of the Zorig Foundation [9] courts are most corrupt. 
 
Status of corruption at various organizations. 
 
Organization Heavy 
corrupt 
Fairly 
corrupt 
Not 
corrupt 
Average 
index 
Courts 79.0 18.9 2.1 1.23 
Customs (airport) 78.5 19.0 2.5 1.24 
Customs (border) 79.6 16.5 4.0 1.24 
Prosecutors office 76.9 21.1 2.0 1.25 
Police (traffic) 71.2 26.0 2.8 1.32 
Police (regular) 70.6 26.0 3.4 1.33 
Tax office 67.6 27.5 5.0 1.37 
Land authorities 66.8 28.4 4.9 1.38 
Local administration 63.6 33.0 3.4 1.40 
Political parties 63.7 32.0 4.3 1.41 
State property committee 59.1 35.8 5.1 1.46 
Ministries and agencies 56.8 39.1 4.1 1.47 
State hospitals 55.5 38.2 6.3 1.51 
Parliament 56.4 35.7 7.9 1.51 
State educational organizations 55.3 37.8 6.9 1.52 
Government cabinet 55.8 34.7 9.5 1.54 
Debt return office 53.7 37.7 8.6 1.55 
Banks 54.8 31.5 13.7 1.59 
Stock exchange 50.9 33.7 15.3 1.64 
Private educational organizations 48.0 37.0 15.0 1.67 
Business (production) 44.9 41.7 13.5 1.69 
Business (service) 45.3 39.6 15.1 1.70 
Private hospitals 48.6 33.0 18.5 1.70 
Office of the President 42.6 37.5 19.9 1.77 
 
 
The establishment of ombudsman’s offices as an alternative external remedy has 
helped to overcome some of the limitations of judicial remedies in many countries. 
The application procedures are generally informal, usually requiring nothing more 
than a simple letter of complaint, but the remedy is a bit “softer,” since an 
ombudsman’s office usually does not have any power of enforcement, but rather uses 
its standing and influence to negotiate solutions to administrative problems directly 
with the relevant agencies.  
 
The actual effectiveness of ombudsman offices depends a great deal on the 
characteristics and reputation of the individual holding the office as well as the overall 
political culture. Unfortunately, this remedy tends to function least well in countries 
where governance problems are the most pronounced, and where administrative 
abuses are often at their worst.  
 
Parliamentary oversight function can be effective remedy for administrative abuses. 
Currently Parliamentary oversight in general is performed occasionally and 
selectively. On the other hand partisanship hinders independency of the oversight, 
especially of the civil service.  
 
Efforts to strengthen external remedies might include supporting the activities of 
NGOs which assist individuals in bringing legal complaints about administrative 
abuses. NGOs often have the knowledge, sophistication and access to professional 
expertise to make effective use of judicial remedies. Further, they usually have the 
resources to publicize their successes, promoting public trust in the remedy and 
enhancing understanding of how to make use of it.  
 
Mongolian NGOs have enough expertise in the area of knowledge of administrative 
abuses, but they lack ability to challenge abuses. And to be frank they have little 
courage to sue officials or government agencies. 
 
Legal aid programs, including state-funded ones, could target the provision of 
assistance on administrative matters.  
 
Preventive Remedies 
 
In abuses relating to administrative actions of more general effect, the principal 
remedies are preventive ones: transparency, freedom of information and public 
participation. Holding a public hearing to allow all points of view to be expressed is 
another effective means for allowing public participation. 
 
In the case of formal rule-making, transparency and public participation might include 
publicizing draft rules, receiving written comments from interested members of the 
public and holding public hearings. In the case of informal rule-making, less formal 
means of communicating with particular representatives of the public, such as NGOs 
and academic institutes, might be employed.  
 
One possibility for strengthening this kind of transparency and public participation is 
to use Internet technology to more widely disseminate draft normative acts and 
policies. Another means of promoting transparency is to promulgate and effectively 
implement a good freedom of information law. 
 
Freedom of Information Law is long waited in Mongolia. For last few years an NGO 
called “Globe International” and some other civil organizations are fighting hard for 
passage of this legislation. Public disclosures of any types are minimal. Such an 
important thing as publication of income declaration is discretionary even at the 
highest level (members of Parliament, Cabinet ministers etc.). 
Useful mechanism is planned under Civil Service Reform project of the World Bank 
office in Mongolia - Compilation of computer data base and network of government 
employees. But again, when asked if this information will be available to the public, 
the answer was “No”. 
 
But securing effective implementation of a freedom of information law most likely 
requires, in turn, the strengthening of both internal and external remedies. At the same 
time, transparency is also one of the means for strengthening other remedies: such as 
making the hiring of civil servants more transparent, making complaint mechanisms 
more transparent, etc. In general, the various types of administrative remedies tend to 
have reciprocal relationships with each other, which if strengthened, have the 
potential to be positively reinforcing. 
 
One final note on remedies: abusive investigation by administrative authorities—one 
of the categories of abuse defined earlier—exemplifies an abuse with few remedies. 
When it involves the solicitation of a bribe or other forms of extortion, some of the 
remedies relating to corruption (an ethics complaint, a police complaint) would at 
least theoretically pertain. However, one of the most common forms of abuse relating 
to this kind of administrative action, the abuse of discretion in the decision of whether 
to investigate, does not generally have adequate remedies at law.  
 
A key obstacle to finding an abuse of discretion in the decision to investigate would 
depend on proving an inappropriate motive on the part of the individual who ordered 
the investigation—i.e., was the motive discriminatory, was it based on partisan 
politics, etc. There would probably be a legal remedy if such proof was possible, but a 
motivation is a fact particularly hard to prove with legal certainty. The decision to 
launch an investigation is an area of discretion with few limitations. 
 
6.0 Improving accountability  
 
Sanctions 
 
The availability and application of sanctions for illegal or inappropriate actions and 
behavior uncovered through answerability constitute the other defining element of 
accountability. Punishment for failures and transgressions gives “teeth” to 
accountability, and in the popular view this is what increasing accountability and 
controlling abuse are all about. Most people equate sanctions with requirements, 
standards, and penalties embodied in laws, statutes, and regulations, but sanctions can 
be thought of more broadly. They include, for example, professional codes of 
conduct, which do not have the status of law, or incentives that are intended to reward 
good behavior and deter bad behavior without necessarily involving recourse to legal 
enforcement. One category of such incentives relates to the use of market mechanisms 
for performance accountability. If public service providers are required to compete for 
clients on the basis of publicly available information on quality and performance, 
accountability is enforced through the ability of clients to switch from low 
quality/performing providers to high quality/performing ones. The ability of service 
users to hold providers accountable by exercising their exit option creates incentives 
for responsiveness and service quality improvement. Another category of “softer” 
sanctions concerns the threat of public exposure or negative publicity by investigative 
panels, the media, and civil society watchdog organizations. Self-policing among 
service providers is another example of the application of this type of sanction, where 
professional codes of conduct are used as the standard. 
 
Sanctions without enforcement significantly diminish accountability. Lack of 
enforcement or selective enforcement undermine citizens’ confidence that 
government agencies are accountable and responsive, and contribute to the creation of 
a culture of impunity that can lead public officials to engage in corrupt practices. 
Enforcement mechanisms are critical, from broad legal and regulatory frameworks to 
internal agency monitoring systems. A lively debate regarding enforcement concerns 
the extent to which service delivery markets can be created such that accountability is 
automatically enforced when poor quality providers are eliminated as purchaser select 
higher quality, more entrepreneurial providers. When actors turn to the legal system 
as the ultimate arbiter of enforcement, problems arise where the courts are subject to 
political influence or control, and the rule of law is not respected.   
 
6.1 Where does the exercise of accountability happen? 
 
Significant to thinking about accountability is identifying where the accountable and 
overseeing actors are located within a particular administrative system, and what their 
relationships with each other are. One broad categorization that is often made 
distinguishes between institutions and actors located within the state, and those 
located outside. Accountability within the state refers to state institutions that curb 
abuses by other public agencies and branches of government, so-called “agencies of 
restraint.” O’Donnell terms this category horizontal accountability: “the existence of 
state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered…to take actions that span from 
routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or 
omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified as unlawful.” 
{4}. 
These state agencies comprise the classic separation of powers, but also include a 
variety of oversight entities, such as audit offices, ombudsmen, courts of accounts, 
and electoral commissions. The effectiveness of these entities depends on both their 
autonomy, which is required to pragmatically pursue their control and sanctioning 
functions, and their ties to other institutions within the government. An important link 
is to the judicial system, which has the authority to prosecute if needed. Also, these 
agencies connect to accountability actors outside the state in that a) they derive some 
of their power from the weight of public opinion, and b) the outcomes of their 
inquiries, investigations, or prosecutions can influence voting, assuming citizens make 
retrospective assessments of government performance. 
The other category concerns accountability from outside of the state. This refers to 
overseeing actors located outside the state that play a role in holding state actors 
accountable. A number of analysts call this category vertical accountability.{5} The 
classic expression of vertical accountability is through periodic elections, which is an 
imperfect instrument for punishing or rewarding governments. Besides elections, this 
category involves citizens, media, civil society organizations (CSOs), and the private 
sector in various activities that seek to articulate demands, investigate and denounce 
wrongdoing, enforce standards of conduct, and provide commentary on the behavior 
and actions of public officials and agencies. 
Three factors influence the ability of these actors to play an effective role in 
accountability. First, they must be connected to some degree to accountability agents 
within the state. For example, if journalists expose corruption via the press, they will 
have little impact unless the judicial system follows through with investigations and 
prosecutions. Second, the quality of democracy in the country influences what they 
are able to accomplish. If basic freedoms, such as access to information, freedom of 
expression and of association, are absent or circumscribed, or if criticism of 
government actions is treated as grounds for harassment or physical violence, then 
accountability from outside the state will be severely constrained. Third, the capacities 
of these actors must be sufficient to allow them to engage in accountability activities. 
The media require basic investigation and reporting skills, as well as agreed-upon 
reporting standards so as to be credible.{6} Civil society must be sufficiently 
developed in order to aggregate demands, exercise voice, take advantage of freedom-
of-information and sunshine laws, and be taken seriously by public officials. 
The defining elements of accountability lead to two preliminary observations. First, it 
appears that accountability that is initiated by civil society has, for the most part, 
limited enforcement and sanctions capacity. This reinforces the point made above 
about the need for linkages with state accountability actors. Second, the strongest 
accountability institutions and mechanisms lie within the state. This suggests the 
importance of capacity and political will on the part of public officials to use these 
institutions and mechanisms for the enforcement of sanctions. It also suggests the 
importance of having in place a supportive legal and institutional framework that 
Civil Society Organizations (CSO) and private sector actors can utilize to exercise 
accountability functions successfully. 
 
In this regard, it is crucially important to carefully monitor beginning stage of the 
functioning and fairness of the Administrative Courts in Mongolia. Civil Society 
Organizations and private sector should assist when necessary appeals by citizen or 
private enterprises.     
 
6.2 Accountability for what?  
 
Three general categories emerge from answering this question. The first addresses the 
most commonly understood notion of accountability, financial accountability. This 
deals with compliance with laws, rules, and regulations regarding financial control 
and management. The second type concerns performance; that is, the consequences of 
government policies, programs, and actions. Do they lead to the intended results, 
produce the desired benefits and results? The third category focuses on 
democratic/political accountability. This consists of holding leaders accountable 
through elections, and touches upon the administrative machinery of government that 
elected leaders direct to achieve public purposes. It deals with the relationship 
between the state and the citizen, citizen participation, equity issues, transparency and 
openness, responsiveness, and trust-building. 
 
Financial accountability 
 
Financial accountability concerns tracking and reporting on allocation, disbursement, 
and utilization of financial resources, using the tools of auditing, budgeting, and 
accounting. The operational basis for financial accountability begins with internal 
agency financial systems that follow uniform accounting rules and standards. Beyond 
individual agency boundaries, finance ministries, and in some situations planning 
ministries, exercise oversight and control functions regarding line ministries and other 
executing agencies. Since many executing agencies contract with the private sector or 
with nonprofit organizations, these oversight and control functions extend to cover 
public procurement and contracting. Legislatures pass the budget law that becomes 
the basis for ministry spending targets, for which they are held accountable. 
Obviously, a critical issue for the viable functioning of financial accountability is the 
institutional capacity of the various public and private entities involved.  For example, 
municipal governments need to be able to install and employ accurate and transparent 
budget systems that can produce usable data for monitoring and planning purposes by 
both budget officials and external overseers.{7}  
 
Performance accountability  
 
Performance accountability refers to demonstrating and accounting for performance in 
light of agreed-upon performance targets. Its focus is on the services, outputs, and 
results of public agencies and programs. Performance accountability is linked to 
financial accountability in that the financial resources to be accounted for are intended 
to produce goods, services, and benefits for citizens, but it is distinct in that financial 
accountability’s emphasis is on procedural compliance whereas performance 
accountability concentrates on results. For example, health care provider payment 
schemes that maximize efficiency, quality of care, equity, and consumer satisfaction 
demand strong financial and management information systems that can produce both 
financial and performance information. Performance accountability is connected to 
democratic/political accountability in that among the criteria for performance are 
responsiveness to citizens and achievement of service delivery targets that meet their 
needs and demands. 
 
Democratic/political accountability 
 
In essence, democratic/political accountability has to do with the institutions and 
mechanisms that seek to ensure that government delivers on electoral promises, 
fulfills the public trust, aggregates and represents citizens’ interests, and responds to 
ongoing and emerging societal needs and concerns. Beyond elections, however, 
democratic/political accountability encompasses citizen expectations for how public 
officials act to formulate and implement policies, provide public goods and services, 
fulfill the public trust, and implement the social contract. Policy-making and service 
delivery relate to aggregating and representing citizens’ interests, and responding to 
ongoing and emerging societal needs and concerns. A central concern here is the issue 
of equity. An important government responsibility is to remedy service provision 
market failures both through regulation and resource allocation. Poor communities, 
rural and urban, often suffer from lack of resources; even if government provides 
fiscal subsidies, facilities and service providers are frequently scarce or nonexistent.  
Increase answerability 
 
Answerability has two facets: reporting and justifying plans and actions. For 
horizontal accountability, routine answerability takes place both within individual 
agencies through hierarchical reporting relationships, and through interactions among 
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Most legislatures, through 
committees, hold hearings where agencies are required to report on the uses of their 
resources. For example, in parliamentary democracies, Public Accounts Committees, 
often chaired by members of the opposition party, exercise ex post review of agency 
spending to assure conformity with intended uses of funds. Constitutionally mandated 
audit and review entities, reporting either to the legislature or the head of state, 
comprise the Office of the Auditor General, and of the Comptroller General.  
 
For external accountability between government and citizens, answerability relates 
directly to transparency. In mature democracies, information about available services, 
eligibility, service delivery procedures, and standards is publicly available. New 
policies, changes in existing policies and procedures, and plans for the future undergo 
public comment and discussion, with citizen participation actively sought out. The 
media and CSOs (Civil Society Organizations) provide independent analysis and 
commentary on these policies and plans, and help interpret government actions and 
decisions to citizens. {8}   
 
Involving CSOs in monitoring performance is a potentially high-payoff approach to 
increasing answerability through the demand side. Service delivery surveys are an 
increasingly widespread mechanism that CSOs employ, often with assistance from 
donors.{13}  Some countries have initiated court watch programs, where CSOs 
monitor and report on the actions of the judiciary, tracking basic indicators of due 
process and judicial efficiency. In countries where governments are shifting to private 
provision of public services, there is experimentation with delegating service quality 
monitoring to associations.  
 
Increase enforcement 
 
The application of sanctions to curb administrative abuse or illegal actions is a 
predominant emphasis in both the practice and theory of increasing accountability. It 
is reflected, for example, in the “fry the big fish” approach to fighting corruption 
where prosecution of prominent lawbreakers is intended to convey the message that 
accountability applies to everyone. Enforcement looms large in efforts to increase the 
effectiveness of financial and performance accountability actors and mechanisms. 
Enforcement measures include increases in penalties for non-compliance or 
malfeasance, reductions in administrative discretion (more frequent reporting), and 
lowered ceilings for approvals to spend funds or take actions. 
 
The majority of enforcement mechanisms lie within government. However, external 
actors can play a role in accountability that moves beyond answerability. This 
highlights the connections between civil society actors and the agencies of restraint. 
As various observers have pointed out, the exposure and denouncing of wrongdoing, 
inequities, or inefficiencies by citizen review committees, watchdog CSOs, or the 
media will not have much impact on increasing accountability unless these actions 
trigger some sort of sanctions. {15} 
Increasing enforcement does not deal only with negative sanctions imposed by formal 
agencies of restraint. Another, more positive, type of sanction is referred to as 
incentives-based enforcement. These sanctions set expectations for behavior, and 
provide various incentives for meeting the expectations. Implementation takes place 
largely through self-policing by public sector actors. Examples include codes of 
conduct, internal agency review boards, employee whistleblowing programs, 
professional associations, and accreditation agencies. An example of codes of conduct 
comes from the United Kingdom where the Committee on Standards in Public Life set 
out seven core principles: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, 
honesty, and leadership. 
 
International standards play a role in setting rules and regulations within a particular 
country. For example, the rules and procedures of the International Accounting 
Standards Committee govern financial accountability. CSOs can play a role in 
standard-setting too. For example, Transparency International (TI) has been 
influential in establishing widely accepted standards for probity and ethical behavior 
related to corruption, and TI’s Corruption Perception Index has served as an 
internationally available outcome measure for application of the standards.  
 
Citizens can have a role in determining standards. One method for such input is 
through service delivery surveys, which collect and report on citizens’ views of 
service quality, availability, cost, and impacts. These surveys use a combination of 
focus groups, household questionnaires, key informant interviews, and community 
surveillance committees to gather information, and then provide feedback to service 
delivery providers and public policy makers, and constitute an accountability 
mechanism.  
 
 
7.0 Policy options and recommendations 
 
 
1. Promotion of new norms and policies in public administration that include: 
 
 clear regulation of the rights, responsibilities and procedures related to the 
exercise of discretion powers. 
 
 regulation of the procedures for the provision of public services, including the right 
to appeal. 
 
 introduction of mechanisms to prevent conflict of interest.  
 
 control of the selection criteria for civil servants. 
 
 introduction of anti-corruption training at all levels of state institutions. 
 
 Introduce competition among public service providers.  
 
Under this public service providers will be required to compete for clients on the 
basis of publicly available information on quality and performance. 
 
 Prohibit structural reforms in the government right after elections (if reforms to be 
introduced they shall take into effect after the office term expires). 
  
2. Improvement of Legal Regulations. 
 
 Improve existing legislation by making provisions of the law clear and precise, so 
that no loopholes exist for potential abuse of power. As Prime Minister Elbegdorj 
said at the opening of the 2005 Spring session of the State Great Hural (Parliament) 
list of legislation vulnerable for abuse should be compiled.  
 
 Improve enforcement mechanisms. 
 
 Introduce more strict sanctions against government abuse, including fines and 
dismissal from the job. 
 
 Adopt Anti-corruption law and introduce Independent Commission Against 
Corruption. 
 
3. Transfer of government functions. 
 
 Contracting out of some government functions to the private and nonprofit sectors 
on fair competition base. For this purpose particular legislation should be 
developed. 
 
4. Transparency. 
 
 Income disclosures for all high and mid-level government officials should be 
publicly available. 
 
 Increase of transparency of all government activities, including appointment and 
recruitment for government jobs, issuing of licenses, procurement information. 
 
 Transparency of all procedures related to public service. 
 
 Obligatory requirement for all public offices to display openly all information 
related to rendering related services to citizens. (Posters prepared by NGOs and 
assisting citizens on how to deal with government are available in great numbers, 
but unfortunately government agencies are hesitant to display them in their offices. 
NGOs need better cooperation in this with the government). 
 
 Introduction of e-government, online procedures for civil applications. 
E-government linked to internet access for increased transparency of the 
government. 
All government information (except state secrecy) should be placed on Internet. 
Online procedures for civil applications, including obtaining of licenses etc.  
 
5. Engaging citizens in policy-making 
 
 Information, Consultation and Public Participation 
Strengthening relations with citizens is a sound investment in better policy-making 
and a core element of good governance. It allows government to tap new sources 
of policy-relevant ideas, information and resources when making decisions. 
Equally important, it contributes to building public trust in government, raising the 
quality of democracy and strengthening civic capacity. Such efforts help strengthen 
representative democracy, in which parliaments play a central role. 
Concrete Steps: 
In strengthening their relations with citizens, governments must ensure that:  
o information is complete, objective, reliable, relevant, easy to find and 
to understand; 
o consultation has clear goals and rules defining the limits of the 
exercise and government's obligation to account for its use of citizens' 
input; 
o participation provides sufficient time and flexibility to allow for the 
emergence of new ideas and proposals by citizens, as well as 
mechanisms for their integration into government policy-making 
processes. 
6. Increase access to information. 
 
 Create of the necessary technical, organizational and legal premises for efficient 
access to information and of the administrative service-provision. 
 
 Adoption of international standard (model) Freedom of Information law /Article 
19/ (for government – Public Interest Disclosure Act, including Whistleblower 
legislation). 
 
7. Develop investigative journalism  
 
 improve investigative journalism skills of media to the level of becoming effective 
watch-dog and pressure agent in holding government accountable. 
 
 Remove harsh provisions from the Criminal and Civil Codes that impose strict 
punishments for defamation.  
 
8. Parliamentary and State Audit oversight over executive branch. 
 
 Instead of random checks, introduce continuous oversight over the civil service and 
the executive branch by the parliament and State Audit.  
 
9, Monitoring policy 
 
Promote monitoring of government by the civil society, including monitoring of the 
government performance, functioning of Administrative courts. 
 
10.  Development of think tanks  
 
 Analyze government activities using civil society think tanks, both issuing 
comments and critics to government abuses and developing alternatives for 
appropriate remedies.  
 
 
# # # 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
 
In 2003 Citizen Information and Service center of the Ovorkhangai aimag’s 
(province)  
Citizen’s Representative Hural (local parliament) conducted survey on corruption. 
Survey was conducted in soums (administrative units) Arvaikheer, Uyanga, 
Nariinteel, Burd, Bayan-Ondor, Yosonzuil, Hujirt and Hairhandulaan of the 
Ovorkhangai aimag. Total of 285 respondents of different age, sex, education and 
employment from urban and rural area participated in the survey. Data is given below 
(statistical errors and variations in transcription were left unchanged as they appear in 
the original document). 
 
Frequency of situations when you had to bribe an official 
Always 32 11,2% 
Sometimes 110 38.5% 
No answer 20 7% 
No 123 43.2 
    
Most corrupt organization 
Aimag governor’s office 20 7% 
Soum governor’s office 9 3% 
Land authorities 28 9% 
Banks 31 10.8 
Tax office 4 1.4% 
State inspectors 31 10.8% 
State fund department 24 8.4% 
Courts 92 32..2% 
Prosecutors 58 20..3% 
Police 129 42.2% 
Hospitals 65 22.8% 
Schools 39 13.8 
 
Causes of corruption  
Decline of morality 57 20% 
Decline of living standard 61 21.4% 
Weakness of law enforcement 78 27.3% 
Officials are not held responsible 81 28.4% 
 
Who’s fault is greater in corruption 
Giver and taker 150 52,6% 
Taker 82 28.7% 
Giver 14 4.9% 
Mediator 9 3.15% 
Don’t know 30 11.6% 
 
Do you believe that corruption will disappear? 
Don’t believe at all 118 41.8% 
Have little confidence 147 51..5% 
Yes, I believe 20 7% 
 
Do you agree that improved information, openness and accountability will lead to less 
corruption? 
Yes 185 65.8% 
No 84 29.4% 
  
Is corruption related to politics? 
Yes 87 30.5% 
No 62 21.7% 
Somewhat 44 15.4% 
Mostly 45 15.7% 
Don’t know 31 10.8% 
 
Who is most vulnerable to corruption? 
Those who have power 97 34% 
High ranking officials  35 12.3% 
Officials in-charge of certain 
issues 
69 24.2% 
Politicians 17 5.9% 
  
Who are the bribe givers? 
Politicians 40 14% 
Businessmen 122 42.8% 
Government employees 40 14% 
Pensioners 29 10.3% 
Everyone 54 18.9% 
 
In your opinion, how corruption should be fought against most efficiently? 
1. Open information   25  8.7% 
2. Increase salaries and benefits for government employees 40 14% 
3. Renew legislation    7  2.4% 
4. Nothing will help    15  5.3% 
5. Fight hard with school teachers and medical workers who treat people differently 
depending on people’s wealth    2.8% 
6. Improve oversight and control  6 2.2% 
 
Your occupation 
1. Government  39 
2. Educational organization 31 
3. State enterprise, public company 10 
4. Health organization 14 
5. Private company, small trade 30 
6. Military, police, courts, procurator 11 
7. NGO 20 
8. Student 18 
9. Pensioner 20 
10. Unemployed 33 
11. Herder 11 
12. Other 48 
 
Your education 
1. University / college 87 
2. Professional school 89 
3. Senior high school 58 
4. Junior high school 46 
5. Primary school 5 
 
Residency 
1. Aimag center 100 
2. Soum center 174 
3. Rural 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Corruption survey was conducted in spring of 2004 by the NGO “Zorig Foundation”. 
Ulaanbaatar city districts, government ministries and agencies, local governments in 
16 aimags were covered, 1000 people including respondents and focus groups.  
 
Open ended question about what is corruption was answered as follows: 
 
Thing that helps to speed up business 13.5% 
Abuse of official position, bureaucracy 13.2% 
Bad for the society, illegal activity 11.8% 
Bribery 9.1% 
Corruption is widespread in the society 8.8% 
It simply exists 7.1% 
It should not exist, should be fought against 4.9% 
It occurred because of weak rule of law, and decline of the living standard 2.6% 
Depends on morality 2.1% 
Don’t know 27.0% 
 
Focus groups revealed interesting stand points on corruption. Here is example of two 
aimags: 
 
Hovd aimag Dornod aimag 
• “I think, it means to give money 
to somebody. To give things to 
bosses in order to get your 
business done” 
• “Illegal revenue, solicitation of  
benefits from others” 
(From interview with mixed group) 
• “It occurs when somebody 
receives a prize from others. 
When somebody receives 
payment in addition to the 
salary for doing an act that he 
or she is ordinarily required to 
do – it is corruption” 
• “A form of distorting of law in 
some way” 
• “Abuse of law in order to 
make yourself pricy” 
• “It is related to human need 
that has no limits. Abuse of 
power” 
(From interview with group 
consisting of teachers, bag 
(smallest administrative unit) 
• “Under corruption people 
understand back doors. This word 
is more commonly used that 
corruption” 
• “To be considered corruption a 
large amount should be given, I 
guess” 
• “Can’t really tell what is 
corruption. Our people don’t 
understand it clearly” 
• “I understand corruption as back 
door, giving and taking of money” 
• “Unlawful satisfaction of own 
needs using public power, such as 
putting somebody into hospital” 
• “Government employees are 
taking side of their acquaintances 
or of people with money” 
(From interview with mixed group) 
governors, administrative 
workers) 
Status of corruption at various organizations. 
 
Organization Heavy 
corrupt 
Fairly 
corrupt 
Not 
corrupt 
Average 
index 
Courts 79.0 18.9 2.1 1.23 
Customs (airport) 78.5 19.0 2.5 1.24 
Customs (border) 79.6 16.5 4.0 1.24 
Prosecutors office 76.9 21.1 2.0 1.25 
Police (traffic) 71.2 26.0 2.8 1.32 
Police (regular) 70.6 26.0 3.4 1.33 
Tax office 67.6 27.5 5.0 1.37 
Land authorities 66.8 28.4 4.9 1.38 
Local administration 63.6 33.0 3.4 1.40 
Political parties 63.7 32.0 4.3 1.41 
State property committee 59.1 35.8 5.1 1.46 
Ministries and agencies 56.8 39.1 4.1 1.47 
State hospitals 55.5 38.2 6.3 1.51 
Parliament 56.4 35.7 7.9 1.51 
State educational organizations 55.3 37.8 6.9 1.52 
Government cabinet 55.8 34.7 9.5 1.54 
Debt return office 53.7 37.7 8.6 1.55 
Banks 54.8 31.5 13.7 1.59 
Stock exchange 50.9 33.7 15.3 1.64 
Private educational organizations 48.0 37.0 15.0 1.67 
Business (production) 44.9 41.7 13.5 1.69 
Business (service) 45.3 39.6 15.1 1.70 
Private hospitals 48.6 33.0 18.5 1.70 
Office of the President 42.6 37.5 19.9 1.77 
Corruption leads to the situation when business is done extra legally. For 
instance, at our organization two positions were granted to unqualified people 
who gave bribes, but not to those qualified. Legally there should be fair 
competition among best candidates for jobs. Now, best people and assigned jobs 
both suffer (from group interview in Hovd).    
 
Evaluation of spreading of corruption 
 
 
 Very 
common 
/1/ 
Common/2
/  rare /3/ 
 Not 
common at 
all /4/ 
Average 
index 
Invite officials for meals 
and give small gifts 56.9 37.1 5.6 0.4 1.50 
Officials provide jobs 
for relatives 58.7 33.3 6.7 1.3 1.51 
Officials use their 
position for private 
gain 53.4 38.3 7.4 1.0 1.56 
Give officials things of 
big value 29.9 45.9 23.1 1.1 1.95 
Give officials big 
amount of money 32.1 37.0 29.2 1.8 2.01 
Government officials 
engage with criminals 25.1 28.7 40.6 5.6 2.27 
 
“Last year one of my brothers needed a surgical operation and we went to the 
hospital. Doctor there said that there are no beds vacant. Among relatives we collected 
40,000 togros (about $40) and gave it to the doctor. Only after that my brother 
underwent the surgery. After the surgery we gave gifts to every surgeon and nurse 
since this was a custom.  
 
 Main reasons why corruption will increase or stay the same in the next two years 
 
Common thing 179 25% 
Laws are not enforced, no fight against corruption 147 20% 
If poverty will remain 110 15% 
Because there is tendency of increasing 63 9% 
Business stalls 54 7% 
Officials don’t change 53 7% 
Stereotype has rooted 39 5% 
Not certain how the society will change 24 3% 
Not enough training and advertising on anti-corruption 22 3% 
Corruption is a main business tool 22 3% 
Elections will remain corrupt 16 2% 
 729 100% 
  
Conclusions derived from opinion surveys. 
 
- Opinion surveys show that corruption in Mongolia is widespread and 
common. Respondents of the opinion poll said that corruption in the 
country is widespread. Those who participated in the focus group stressed 
that corruption is becoming everyday routine and standard relation 
between people. They say that without learning those standards it is very 
difficult to conduct everyday life and business. 
- Public understanding of corruption is not uniform, contradictory. At the 
level of average thinking understanding of corruption and about its forms 
and occurrences are very weak. General understanding of corruption is that 
this is a way of  fixing things via bribing officials. It should be noted that 
also some positive attitude towards corruption exists. Responses that 
bribes help to foster an issue and reduce red tape were among high 
percentage ones. This is an alarming tendency. 
- During our survey, Government institutions that were named most corrupt 
in the past surveys (courts, police, prosecutors office, customs, tax office 
and land office), remained in their previous positions. Even worse, 
corruption is prospering more than ever in those institutions. 
- Among causes of corruption most frequently named are following: low 
living standard of the population, low income (specially of the government 
officials), weak legal environment, discrepancy between official power 
and responsibility. In addition to above causes, during focus group 
discussions bureaucratic red tape was named as one of major reasons for 
corrupt conduct. Bureaucracy in the government offices became one of 
working styles and specifics for government officials. 
- People stress many negative consequences of corruption, but also 
complain that there are no legal and judicial remedies (restoration of 
dignity, reimbursement for damage) for those who were affected by 
corruption. According to survey, corruption always violates human rights 
and threatens liberties. Also it leads to deterioration of social justice, rule 
of law and morality. At the same time corruption causes material damage 
to citizen and the country, adds to the increase of social inequality, to the 
gap between rich  and poor, rockets poverty rate. 
- Respondents say that rate of solving corruption cases are low in the 
country due to the fact that authorities and officials themselves are 
involved, and on the other hand they interfere with investigations. On the 
top of that giving and taking of bribes became common practice in the 
society. 
- People’s evaluation of the fight against corruption by governmental and 
non-governmental organizations is very low. This is a sign that society 
accepts corruption and became used to it. Another issue tested by the 
survey is the most effective organization to deal with corruption. 
Respondents see as the most suitable independent body with special 
powers, not the government, nor the NGO. 
- People are critical about legal regulations on anti-corruption. In their view 
no improvements occurred in this area since 1999. One of reasons of such 
negative evaluation might be poor legal education of the public on the 
corruption. 
- More that 80% of survey respondents said that corruption will remain at 
the current state or even worsen in the future. 
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